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Abstract. This paper develops a simple optimizing model to characterize the monetary policy 
pursued by the Federal Reserve. The model parameters are estimated for the period of high 
inflation in the 1970s and the estimates are used to quantify the impact of misperceptions of the 
natural rate of unemployment on average inflation during this period. The results point to a 
relatively small role for misperceptions; instead, the high inflation of the 1970s is attributed to a 
high inflation target. One explanation for the high inflation target is the fact that the political 




   The 1970s witnessed the longest and most severe peacetime inflation in U.S. history. By 
contrast, since the early 1980s the U.S. inflation rate has been relatively low and stable. What 
accounts for this difference? One view, put forth by Clarida, Gali and Gertler (2000) – hereafter 
referred to as CGG – and others, attributes the improvement in inflation performance to the 
Federal Reserve’s adoption of a superior monetary policy rule. CGG estimate a Taylor rule 
(Taylor, 1993) for the Federal Reserve before and after 1979. They find that since 1979 the Fed’s 
policy rule has been stabilizing in the sense that the federal funds rate has been increased more 
than one-for-one with any increase in expected inflation. Prior to 1979, on the other hand, policy 
was destabilizing, which left the economy vulnerable to an increase in inflation due to self-
fulfilling expectations. 
  An alternative view – referred to here as the “misperceptions” view – is put forth by 
Orphanides (2000a, 2000b, 2002). Orphanides argues that the Federal Reserve’s policy appears 
unstable only ex post; at the time, given the data the Fed had to work with, the Fed’s policies 
would have been seen as stabilizing. Orphanides (2002) shows this by estimating Taylor rules for 
the 1970s using “real-time” data and the Fed’s Greenbook forecasts of inflation and 
unemployment. He finds that when estimated with this data the Taylor rule was actually 
stabilizing during the 1970s. In fact, the actual path of the federal funds rate during this period 
was similar to that produced by the original version of Taylor’s rule applied to real time data.
1 At 
the same time, however, the Fed seems to have systematically underestimated the natural rate of 
unemployment and inflation during this time period, resulting in an overly inflationary policy 
despite the existence of a stable policy rule. 
                                                 
1 The original Taylor rule, with the unemployment gap substituted for the output gap, is i=r*+p*+b(p-p*)+g(u*-u), 
where i is the federal funds rate, p is the inflation rate, u is the unemployment rate, r* is the natural real rate of 
interest, p* is the target inflation rate, and u* is the natural unemployment rate. Using an Okun’s law coefficient of 
3, Taylor’s rule sets b=g=1.5 and p*=r*=2.   2
  These two perspectives on the Great Inflation have important implications for the current 
debate over the design of monetary policy rules. One intepretation of CGG’s work – suggested 
by CGG themselves – is that the improvement of the policy rule was a result of advances in 
macroeconomic theory that impressed on policymakers the absence of a long-run tradeoff 
between inflation and unemployment and the importance of expectations and policy credibility. 
This interpretation would suggest that the experience of the 1970s is unlikely to repeat itself. The 
Fed can continue to use monetary policy to stabilize both inflation and unemployment without 
fear of a severe inflation problem in the future, as long as it continues to adhere to the Taylor 
principle. By contrast, Orphanides argues that given the Fed’s inability to accurately estimate the 
natural rate of unemployment, a return to high inflation is always possible even under a stable 
Taylor rule as long as the Fed targets the unemployment rate. Better outcomes could be 
achieved, he argues, if the Fed abandoned the Taylor rule’s twin goals of stable prices and stable 
unemployment and concentrated exclusively on price stability. 
  This paper extends previous studies of the causes of the Great Inflation in two important 
ways. First, rather than model monetary policymakers as following an “instrument rule” of the 
type assumed by CGG and Orphanides, this paper assumes an optimizing monetary policymaker. 
An optimizing policymaker, as Svensson (2003) points out, pursues a “targeting rule” in the form 
of an Euler equation containing forecasts of inflation and unemployment rather than an 
instrument rule. Second, estimates of the model are used to calculate the magnitude of the effect 
of misperceptions on inflation and to test for a change in the Fed’s preferences after 1979. 
  As Svensson argues, the use of an optimizing monetary policy framework rather than a 
Taylor rule has several advantages. The assumption of an optimizing central bank is consistent 
with the now-standard approach to macroeconomics which grounds relationships like the IS and   3
Phillips curves in optimizing behavior on the part of the public. Furthermore, in practice, central 
banks do in fact tend to frame their decisions as targeting rules – specifying a desired range for 
inflation and/or growth, for example – rather than instrument rules. Of course, something like a 
Taylor rule can be derived as a reduced form relationship by combining the optimal decision rule 
with an aggregate demand equation. But for standard models such as the one in this paper, the 
result is different in significant ways from the Taylor rules estimated by CGG, Orphanides, and 
others.
2 Finally, as a reduced form relationship the Taylor rule may be subject to instability as a 
result of changes in the structure of the economy. This is particularly problematic when the 
objective is to compare monetary policy before and after 1979. 
  Section 1 reviews some of the evidence for the misperceptions view of the Great Inflation 
in order to motivate the empirical work that is the central contribution of this paper. Section 2  
presents an optimizing model of monetary policymaking in which the Federal Reserve chooses 
combinations of expected inflation and unemployment to minimize a loss function subject to a 
Phillips curve. Using the Fed’s Greenbook forecasts of inflation and unemployment as well as an 
alternative set of forecasts derived from a vector autoregression, I estimate the parameters of the 
loss function, including the implied inflation target. I assess the ability of the model to fit the 
inflation and unemployment data in order to judge whether monetary policy during the 1970s can 
reasonably be characterized as the outcome of optimizing behavior. Since optimal monetary 
policy implies a stabilizing policy rule (as CGG (1999) show), this has direct bearing on the 
CGG’s (2000) main finding. Section 3 uses the results from section 2 to compute the impact of 
misperceptions on inflation in the 1970s. I show that misperceptions can account for at most a 
small fraction of the difference between average inflation in the 1970s and 1980s-90s. Section 4 
                                                 
2 In particular, the modified Taylor rule implied by the optimizing model used in this paper has the Fed responding 
to a weighted average of expected future inflation rates and unemployment rates, the weights being functions of the 
Phillips curve and preference parameters. This was shown in an earlier version of this paper.   4
then estimates the model for the post-1979 sample and uses the results to propose an alternative 
explanation for the Great Inflation. The results are also used to predict how much inflation would 
rise today if the Fed underestimated the natural rate of unemployment to the same extent as it 
apparently did in the 1970s. Section 5 concludes.  
 
1.  Circumstantial evidence in favor of the misperceptions theory 
  Figures 1 through 4 marshal some circumstantial evidence for the misperceptions view 
from the Federal Reserve’s Greenbook forecasts. The Greenbook, which is prepared by the 
Federal Reserve’s staff economists in preparation for every FOMC meeting, contains forecasts of 
the GNP deflator, the unemployment rate, and other variables. The forecasts are typically made 
for the current quarter and from four quarters to nine quarters ahead. Greenbook forecasts of the 
GNP deflator from 1966 on were taken from the FRB Philadelphia website, as were Greenbook 
forecasts of unemployment from 1978 on. Greenbook forecasts of unemployment prior to 1978 
were made available by the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve. For each quarter, the 
forecasts used here correspond to those for the FOMC meeting nearest to the middle of the 
quarter.
3 
  In these figures and throughout the paper, I define the period of high inflation in the U.S. 
as beginning around 1965 and ending in 1979:2 (see Boschen and Weise (2003) for a discussion 
of the “start dates” for inflation episodes in the U.S. and other OECD countries). Data for 1979:3 
to 1984:4 are included in the figures for purposes of comparison. Figures 1 and 2 plot the actual 
level of the GNP deflator and unemployment rate as well as the corresponding Greenbook 
forecasts. The forecasted levels of the deflator are those implied by the Greenbook forecasts of 
                                                 
3 In a few cases the Greenbook associated with mid-quarter FOMC meetings did not contain sufficiently long-range 
forecasts; in these cases forecasts are drawn from Greenbooks for meetings closer to the end of the quarter.   5
inflation rates, setting the estimated level in the quarter before the forecast date equal to the 
actual value. Forecasts made in the first quarter of each year for quarters 1 to 4 are shown. 
Figures 3 and 4 are similar to figures in Orphanides (2002). They show the average inflation rate 
and unemployment rate for the current and succeeding three quarters, in the actual data and 
according to the Greenbook forecasts. Gaps in the forecast series correspond to periods in which 
three-quarter-ahead forecasts were not presented in the Greenbook. Figure 4 also shows two 
estimates of the natural rate of unemployment. The “actual” natural rate is estimated as a two-
sided 10 year moving average using the latest data available, while the “real-time” estimate of 
the natural rate is computed as a one-sided backward-looking 10 year moving average of the 
unemployment rates.
4 While the actual process by which the Fed estimated the natural rate of 
unemployment during this period is unknown, it seems likely that a moving average of the data 
is a reasonable approximation to whatever technique was actually in use.  
Figures 1 and 3 show that the Fed substantially underestimated inflation at various times 
during the period of high inflation, notably in 1968-69 and 1973-74. By contrast, from 1980-84 
the Fed’s forecasts exceed the actual level on average. Over the entire period 1969:1-1979:2, the 
Fed’s three quarter ahead forecast of inflation averages 0.95 percentage points below the actual 
level. The Fed underestimates inflation by an average of 1.24 percent from 1969:1 to 1972:4, by 
2.61 percent from 1973:1 to 1974:3, and by 0.25 percent from 1974:4 to 1979:2. By contrast, in 
the disinflationary period from 1979:3 to 1984:4, the Fed overestimates inflation by an average 
of 0.87 percentage points. 
Unanticipated oil price shocks surely account for much of the underestimation of 
inflation in 1973-74. But Figures 2 and 4 show that the Fed’s unemployment forecasts appear to 
                                                 
4 Because revisions to the unemployment series are relatively small, there is very little difference between a one-
sided moving average of real-time unemployment rates and a one-sided moving average of unemployment rates 
from the latest available data.   6
be roughly unbiased over the 1969-79 period, and on target even in 1973-74. Orphanides (2002) 
takes this as evidence that while the Fed was able to meet its targets for real activity through 
skillful management of interest rates, it miscalculated the impact of its policies on inflation 
because it underestimated the natural rate of unemployment. Figure 4 shows that the “actual” 
natural rate is significantly higher than the “real-time” natural rate: if policymakers estimated the 
natural rate as something like a moving average of past observed unemployment rates, which 
seems as good an approximation as any to the Fed’s actual estimation procedure, they would 
have underestimated the natural rate by an average of 1.04 percentage points from 1969:1 to 
1979:2.  
  One caveat in interpreting the Greenbook forecasts is that they are typically constructed 
on the assumption of a continuation of current interest rates. Thus when the Greenbook forecasts 
understate the true inflation rate, this could reflect a conscious easing of policy rather than a 
mistaken forecast. If this were the dominant phenomenon, we would expect to see the Fed 
consistently overestimating unemployment at the same time that it underestimated inflation. 
Since this is not the case, the story told by Orphanides would seem to be the best interpretation 
of the data. 
While the Fed seems to have mis-estimated the natural rate of unemployment during the 
1970s, the question whether this mis-estimation can explain all or most of the high inflation of 
the period remains unanswered. Orphanides (2000a) offers a rough estimate of the magnitude of 
the effect of the effect. Suppose the Fed follows the Taylor rule 
 
  it=r*+p*+b(pt-p*)+g(u*-ut)  (1) 
   7
where it is the federal funds rate, pt is the inflation rate, ut is the unemployment rate, r* is the 
natural real rate of interest, p* is the target inflation rate, and u* is the Fed’s estimate of the 
natural rate of unemployment. Let the actual natural rate of unemployment be u
n and u* = u
n+h, 
where h is the error in the Fed’s estimate of the natural rate. Then (1) can be rewritten 
 
  it = r*+p*+b(pt-p*)+g(u
n-ut)+gh  (2) 
 
On average over sufficiently long periods of time i = r*+p and u = u
n, so 
 
  (b-1)(p-p*)+gh = 0  (3) 
 
or p-p* = -g/(b-1)h. So if p* = 2, h = -1.5 (the Fed underestimates the natural rate by 1.5 
percentage points), and g = b = 1.5, then p = 6.5 percent, which is very close to the average of 
6.3 percent over the period 1969:1 to 1979:2. Thus, he argues, the misperceptions theory can in 
principle explain all of the high inflation of the 1970s. 
  An optimizing central bank, however, will not obey a Taylor rule such as that in equation 
1. Suppose the Federal Reserve sets its monetary policy instrument to achieve unemployment 
and inflation rates in order to minimize the loss function
5 
 
  L0 =  [ ] ￿
¥
=





t *) u u )( 1 ( *) (
2
1
  (4) 
 
                                                 
5 For simplicity I assume perfect foresight here.   8
subject to the Phillips curve equation 
 
  pt = k-l(ut-u
n)+fpt-1+et  (5) 
 
The solution to the central bank’s problem can be found using the Lagrangian method: the 
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where yt is the Lagrange multiplier associated with equation 5. Differentiating with respect to pt 
and ut yields the first order conditions  
 
  a(pt-p*) + yt - f yt+1 = 0 
  (1-a)(ut-u*) + lyt = 0  (7) 
 
Combining these equations gives us the central bank’s Euler equation: 
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As above, define u*=u
n+h. Then (8) becomes 
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The inflation bias is proportional to the error in estimating the natural rate, with the factor of 
proportionality a function of the slope of the Phillips curve, the relative weight attached to 
inflation and unemployment in the central bank’s loss function, and the degree of inflation 
persistence. The inflation bias introduced by underestimation of the natural rate disappears as the 
weight on unemployment in the central bank’s loss function goes to zero and as the inflation 
persistence parameter approaches one. Thus to determine the effect of misperceptions of the 
natural rate on inflation it is necessary to estimate the parameters of the Phillips curve along with 
those of the central bank’s loss function. This task is taken up in the next section. 
 
2.  Estimation of central bank preferences 
  In this paper central bank preferences are estimated from a model like the one described 
by equations (4) and (5) in a two-step method. In the first step, the Phillips curve is estimated by 
OLS. In the second step, the Phillips curve coefficients are taken as given and inserted into 
equation (9). Equation (9) is then estimated using nonlinear least squares to produce estimates of 
a and p*. Since the estimates of the key parameters, a and p*, depend on the estimates of the 
Phillips curve, it is important to specify a Phillips curve that provides a good fit to the data. An   10
extension of equation (5) variants of which are often used in empirical work (see, e.g. Rudebusch 
(2001)) fits the data nicely: 
 
  t t 4 t 4 3 t 3 2 t 2 1 t 1 1 t t z u ~ e + d + p f + p f + p f + p f + l - k = p - - - - -   (11) 
 
where zt is the percentage change in oil prices from the middle of period t-4 to the middle of 
period t and  t u ~ = ut-
n
t u  is the unemployment gap. In addition to the extra lags on inflation, 
equation (11) differs from equation (5) in two important respects: the natural rate of 
unemployment is time-varying rather than constant, and unemployment affects inflation with a 
one-period lag. Table 1 presents estimates of equation (11) over the period 1961:2-1979:2 using 
quarterly data from the S&P/DRI database on CD-ROM (January 2003). The inflation rate is 
defined as 400 times the change in the log of the GDP deflator (S&P/DRI mnemonic GDPD), the 
unemployment rate is the civilian unemployment rate (LHUR), the oil price inflation variable is 
100 times the change in the log of the producer price index for crude petroleum from period t-4 
to period t (PW561), and the natural rate of unemployment is approximated using a two-sided ten 
year moving average as above. As shown in the table, the unemployment gap has a negative and 
statistically significant effect on inflation, while increases in the price of oil have a positive and 
significant effect. The model explains 82.5 percent of the variation in inflation over the period 
and there is no evidence of serial correlation in the residuals as evidenced by the Breusch-
Godfrey test.  
  To solve the model consisting of equations (4) and (11) – which I refer to as the standard 
model – we set up the Lagrangian as before: 
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In this model the timing of the Fed’s actions and their effect on the economy is important. I 
assume that at each period t, the Fed takes a policy action based on information available at the 
end of period t-1 that affects the unemployment rate in period t, and therefore inflation in period 
t+1.
6 Consequently the Fed controls its forecast of the unemployment rate in period t as well as 
its forecast of the inflation rate in period t+1. The first order conditions for this problem are 
 
  (1-a)Et-1 t u ~ +lEt-1yt+1 = 0  
    (13) 
  a(Et-1pt+1-p*)+Et-1yt+1-f1Et-1yt+2-f2Et-1yt+3-f3Et-1yt+4-f4Et-1yt+5 = 0 
 
Combining these equations produces the Euler equation 
 
  al(Et-1pt+1-p*)-(1-a)[Et-1 t u ~ -f1Et-1 1 t u ~
+ -f2Et-1 2 t u ~
+ -f3Et-1 3 t u ~
+ -f4Et-1 4 t u ~
+ ] = 0  (14) 
 
Equation (14) is estimated by assigning values for l and the fi’s from Table 1 and then using 
nonlinear least squares to produce estimates of a and p*. Forecasts of inflation and the 
unemployment gap (Et-1pt+1, Et-1 t u ~ , etc.) are drawn from the Greenbooks. The forecasts of the 
unemployment gap are computed by taking the difference between the Greenbook forecast of 
unemployment and the “real time” estimate of the natural rate discussed above.  
                                                 
6 Equivalently, we could assume the Fed takes a policy action in period t-1 based on information available at the end 
of period t-1 that affects unemployment in period t.   12
  As mentioned above, one potential problem with using the Greenbook forecasts to 
estimate equation (14) is that the forecasts are typically made contingent on no change in 
monetary policy. Thus if in a given period the Fed is confronted with new information that calls 
for a substantial change in policy, the forecasted inflation and unemployment rates do not 
necessarily represent the Fed’s intended levels of inflation and unemployment, and we would not 
expect equation (14) to hold. I therefore run a parallel set of regressions that use forecasts of 
inflation and unemployment from a vector autoregression in place of the Greenbook forecasts. 
Specifically, at each period t I run a vector autoregression using the previous ten years of data 
(the sample ends in period t-1). The VAR includes four lags of the inflation rate and 
unemployment rate (defined above), as well as the federal funds rate (FYFF) and the spread 
between the interest rate on ten-year Treasury bonds (FYGT10) and three-month Treasury bills 
(FYGM3). The four-quarter percentage change in oil prices (defined above) is included as an 
exogenous variable. The VAR is then used to construct forecasts of inflation and unemployment 
for periods t to t+4. As with the Greenbook forecasts, the forecasted unemployment gap is the 
difference between the forecasted unemployment rate and the “real time” estimate of the natural 
rate. Running the VAR on ten years of data ending one quarter prior to the date at which the 
forecast is made preserves the “real time” nature of the forecasts that is a feature of the 
Greenbook forecasts.
7 Assuming the federal funds rate is the Fed’s monetary policy instrument, 
the use of dynamic VAR forecasts incorporates monetary policy actions expected over the 
forecast horizon, unlike the Greenbook forecasts. 
  The first two columns of Table 2 show the results of estimation of equation (14) using the 
two alternative forecast variables. Four-quarter ahead Greenbook forecasts are available from 
                                                 
7 The VARs are estimated using the latest updated data from the S&P/DRI rather than from “vintage” data used by 
some researchers (e.g. Croushore and Stark (2001)). Any differences between forecasts derived from this data and 
those derived from vintage data are likely to be small.   13
1969:1 on with some quarters of missing data in the early 1970s, so the sample period is 1969:1-
1979:2. The results show that the Fed gave roughly equal weight to inflation and unemployment 
during this period: the estimate of a is 0.546 in the regression using Greenbook forecasts and 
0.434 in the regression using VAR forecasts. The estimated inflation target is rather high, 5.247 
in the regression using Greenbook forecasts and 5.947 in the regression using VAR forecasts. 
(By comparison, average actual inflation over this period was 6.3 percent and average forecasted 
inflation was 6.0 percent). 
  The model’s “goodness of fit” can be assessed by comparing the forecasted 
unemployment and inflation rates with the forecasts implied by the model. That is, we use the 
model estimates to construct a path for Et-1 t u ~  based on forecasts of inflation and unemployment. 
Likewise, we can construct a path for Et-1pt+1 based on forecasts of unemployment. Figure 5 
shows the results of this exercise. The model tracks the unemployment gap, whether measured 
using the Greenbook or VAR forecasts, fairly well. That is, given the expected inflation rate and 
expected future unemployment rates, the model’s prediction of the Fed’s choice of 
unemployment rate is close to the actual forecast. This is not the case with the inflation forecasts, 
however. In fact, the two series appear to be negatively correlated. One is forced to conclude that 
the standard model does not provide a satisfactory account of the Federal Reserve’s behavior in 
the 1970s. 
  To better account for movements in the inflation rate, I propose an alternative model of 
monetary policy making, which I refer to as the “partial adjustment” model. In this model each 
period the Federal Reserve’s target rate of inflation is a weighted average of a long-run inflation 
target and the previous period’s inflation rate. That is, the Fed’s loss function takes the form 
   14
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    where pt* = qpt-1+(1-q)p* 
 
This model assumes that the Fed distinguishes between its short run and long run inflation 
targets, which seems to be a plausible characterization of Fed behavior. This specification 
justifies a gradualist or “opportunistic” approach to disinflation such as occurred in the 1980s 
and 1990s. Solving the Fed’s new optimization problem in the same way as above yields the 
Euler equation 
 
  al[(Et-1pt+1-pt*)-q(Et-1pt+2- Et-1pt+2*)] 
    -(1-a)[Et-1 t u ~ -f1Et-1 1 t u ~
+ -f2Et-1 2 t u ~
+ -f3Et-1 3 t u ~
+ -f4Et-1 4 t u ~
+ ] = 0  (16) 
 
The estimates of a, q, and p* from equation (16) are reported in the last two columns of Table 2. 
The estimates of the long-run inflation target are little changed from the standard model. The 
partial adjustment parameter, q, is large and statistically significant. The incorporation of partial 
adjustment of the inflation target increases the estimated value of a substantially. The fit of this 
model is a vast improvement over that of the standard model, as shown by a comparison of the 
sum of squared residuals and log likelihoods in the two models. The improvement in fit is also 
illustrated in Figure 6, which is constructed in the same way as Figure 5. The partial adjustment 
model brings the fitted values of the inflation forecast much more closely in line with the actual 
forecasts, at the cost of some deterioration in the fit to the unemployment forecast data. Despite 
its simplicity, the model’s predictions are not far out of line with the actual forecast data. The 
satisfactory fit of the model together with the ability to reject the hypothesis that the weight on   15
inflation in the Fed’s loss function is zero (see Table 2) suggests – contrary to CGG – that the 
Federal Reserve was pursuing a stabilizing, optimizing monetary policy during the 1970s.  
 
3.  The effect of misperceptions on average inflation, 1969-1979 
  The results in Table 2 can be used to assess the quantitative impact of misperceptions of 
the natural rate of unemployment on the average rate of inflation during the period of high 
inflation. The total extent of the Federal Reserve’s misperception of the unemployment gap can 
be decomposed as 
 
  Et-1 t u ~ - t u ~ = (Et-1ut-ut) – (Et-1
n
t u - n
t u ) = xt-ht   (17) 
 
where xt”Et-1ut-ut is the Fed’s misperception of the actual rate of unemployment (the difference 
between the Fed’s forecast and the actual rate) and ht” Et-1
n
t u - n
t u  is the Fed’s misperception of 
the natural rate of unemployment (here, the difference between the one-sided and two-sided 
moving average estimates of the natural rate). Let x be the average misperception of the actual 
rate of unemployment over the period and h be the average misperception of the natural rate over 
the period. Assume that over the period 1969:1-1979:2 the actual unemployment gap is zero on 
average.
8 For the standard model, substituting equation (17) into equation (14) and setting the 
actual unemployment gap equal to zero gives us a relationship between the deviation of inflation 
from its target and the extent of misperceptions of the unemployment gap: 
 
                                                 
8 In fact the average unemployment gap (the actual rate minus the two-sided moving average) is –0.07, that is, seven 
one-hundredths of a percentage point.   16
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instead of equation (14) gives us a similar formula for the partial adjustment model with 
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= b . Table 3 uses these formulas to quantify the impact of misperceptions on 
inflation during 1969:1-1979:2. The first row of Table 3 shows the estimates of b for each 
specification of the model using the estimates of f and l from Table 1 and the estimates of a and 
q from Table 2. Depending on the model specification, for every one percentage point that the 
Federal Reserve overestimated the unemployment gap over the period, the inflation rate exceeds 
the target inflation rate by 0.324 to 0.871 percentage points. The total misperception of the 
unemployment gap over the period was 1.077 using the Greenbook unemployment forecasts and 
1.039 using the VAR unemployment forecasts. This means that the total effect of misperceptions 
was to increase the average inflation rate by 0.325 to 0.907 percentage points above target. 
Almost all of the excess inflation is due to misperceptions of the natural rate (h) rather than 
misperceptions of the actual current rate of unemployment (x). 
  The calculations above suggest that misperceptions account for a relatively small amount 
of the excess inflation experienced from 1969-79 compared to, say, the period 1983-2002. The 
average inflation rate from 1969-79 was 6.3 percent while the average rate from 1983-2002 was 
2.5 percent. My calculations attribute at most 0.9 percent, or less than a quarter, of the difference 
in inflation rates to misperceptions. Given the values of f, q, and l estimated above, according to 
the partial adjustment model a would have to be as low as around 0.14 to explain the entire   17
difference in inflation rates. This raises the question, what did account for the difference in 
inflation rates before and after 1979? 
 
4.  Federal Reserve preferences since 1979 
  This section replicates the analysis of Fed policy in the previous section for the period 
since 1979 in an attempt to explain the difference in inflation experience in the U.S. before and 
after 1979. Table 4 shows the results of estimation of the Phillips curve for the period 1979:3-
2002:3. The estimates suggest some structural change between the two periods; specifically, 
unemployment and changes in oil prices have a smaller impact on inflation in the later sample, 
and inflation is more persistent (f=.911 in the later period, versus .764 in the earlier period). 
Table 5 presents estimates of the Fed’s preference parameters over the period 1983:1-1997:4 (the 
period 1979:3-1982:4 is regarded as a period of transition between monetary policy regimes and 
is therefore excluded; Greenbook forecasts are not available after 1997:4). The estimates show a 
large increase in the weight the Fed assigns to inflation in its loss function: in the standard 
model, the estimate of a rises from 0.55 to 0.88 when Greenbook forecasts are used and from 
0.43 to 0.89 when VAR forecasts are used; in the partial adjustment model, a rises from 0.85 to 
0.97 when Greenbook forecasts are used and from 0.71 to 0.99 when VAR forecasts are used. 
The long-run inflation target also seems to have fallen dramatically, from over 5 percent in the 
1969-79 period to between 2.01 and 3.31 percent in the later period.  
  These results can be used to decompose the difference in average inflation rates between 
the two time periods. Equation (18) says that the average inflation rate in a given period is 
composed of the target inflation rate and the effect of misperceptions of the unemployment gap. 
Table 6 uses this framework and the methods described in reference to Table 3 to quantify these   18
effects. The first thing to note about Table 6 is the very small effect of misperceptions in the later 
sample. The unemployment gap was underestimated over this period by an average of 0.66 
percentage points using Greenbook forecasts and 0.71 percentage points using VAR forecasts, 
primarily because the real-time estimate of the natural rate of unemployment was about 0.69 
percentage points above the ex post estimate, which would have tended to reduce inflation. 
However, the estimates of b are much lower during the 1983-97 period, ranging from .014 to 
.076 across the four model specifications. The value of b is reduced relative to the earlier period 
because of the larger values of a and f, while the smaller value of l has the effect of increasing 
b. 
  The key number to be explained in Table 6 is the difference in average actual inflation 
rates in the two periods, 6.27 percent in 1969-79 versus 2.79 in 1983-97, or 3.48 percentage 
points of excess inflation. The standard model with Greenbook forecasts accounts for 2.59 
percentage points of the excess inflation. Of this, 2.00 percentage points is due to a higher 
inflation target in the earlier period and 0.59 percentage points is due to misperceptions. The 
numbers are very similar for the partial adjustment model with Greenbook forecasts. The models 
using VAR forecasts overestimate the difference in inflation during the two periods (4.63 
percentage points under the standard model and 4.69 percentage points for the partial adjustment 
model). The majority of the difference is again attributed to a higher inflation target in the earlier 
period, leaving a relatively small role for misperceptions. 
  It is somewhat unsatisfying to argue that the high inflation of the 1970s was due to the 
Fed’s having a preference for high inflation. This explanation raises the question, why did the 
Fed have a high inflation target in the 1970s, and why was it lowered in the 1980s? It is probably 
not the case that the Fed believed that five percent inflation was optimal in the 1970s, and then   19
determined that two percent was optimal in the 1980s. One piece of evidence against this view is 
the Congressional testimony of Arthur Burns (1977, p. 225), chairman of the Fed in the early 
1970s: 
“…despite heartening progress over the past two years, inflation is still 
proceeding at a troublesome rate almost everywhere. In 1976, consumer 
prices in this country rose about 5 per cent. This was down from 7 per cent 
in 1975 and 12 per cent in 1974. But our businessmen as well as other 
citizens fear that the continuation of even a 5 per cent rate of inflation may 
be incompatible with the attainment of durable prosperity.” 
 
Even Congress in the Humphrey-Hawkins Amendment of 1978 called for “reducing the rate of 
inflation…to not more than 3 per centum” within five years; a clear indication that the 6.8 
percent inflation rate that prevailed from 1977 to 1978 was well in excess of Congress’ long-run 
target.
9 
  One explanation for the higher estimated inflation target in the 1970s is that the estimate 
reflects not a higher target for inflation, but a lower target for unemployment. Suppose that the 
Fed seeks to hold unemployment not to its estimate of the natural rate, but to some value below 
this. This is the classic inflation bias problem introduced by Kydland and Prescott (1977) and 
Barro and Gordon (1983). Let the Fed’s unemployment target by Et-1
n
t u -n, n>0, so the Fed’s 






t n + a - + p - p a = . With these 
preferences the Fed’s Euler equation becomes  
 
  al(Et-1pt+1-p*) 
    -(1-a)[Et-1 t u ~ -f1Et-1 1 t u ~
+ -f2Et-1 2 t u ~
+ -f3Et-1 3 t u ~
+ -f4Et-1 4 t u ~
+ ] – (1-a)(1-f)n = 0  (19) 
 
                                                 
9 Title 15, Chapter 21, Section 1022a(b)(2) of the U.S. Code. Significantly, the text continues “Provided, That 
policies and programs for reducing the rate of inflation shall be designed so as not to impede achievement of the 
goals and timetables specified in clause (1) of this subsection for the reduction of unemployment,” namely a four 
percent unemployment rate among individuals 16 years old and older.   20
Grouping the constant terms together we have 
 
 
  – [alp*+(1-a)(1-f)n] + alEt-1pt+1 
    -(1-a)[Et-1 t u ~ -f1Et-1 1 t u ~
+ -f2Et-1 2 t u ~
+ -f3Et-1 3 t u ~
+ -f4Et-1 4 t u ~
+ ] = 0  (20) 
 
It is apparent from equation (20) that p* and n are not separately identified. Above, identification 
was achieved by setting n=0, but it could just as easily have been achieved by setting p* equal to 
some constant. Taking steady state values, and accounting for misperceptions of the current 
actual and natural rates of unemployment as we did before, equation (20) becomes 
 
  p = p*+b(x-h+n)  (21) 
 
where b is defined as in equation (18) above (an analogous equation holds for the partial 
adjustment model). It follows that if we take p*=2 as the Fed’s long-term inflation target, the 
estimates n=0, p*= * ˆ p  reported in Table 2 are observationally equivalent to n=(1/b)( * ˆ p -2), 
p*=2. That is, if we estimated the models as in Table 2 but setting p*=2, we would get values for 
n equal to 6.45 for the standard model with Greenbook forecasts, 4.99 for the standard model 
with VAR forecasts, 10.70 for the partial adjustment model with Greenbook forecasts, and 4.35 
for the partial adjustment model with VAR forecasts. With p*=3, we get values for n equal to 
4.46, 3.72, 7.61, and 3.20 according to the model specification. Given that the average real-time 
estimate of the natural rate over this period was about 5 percent, this implies that – assuming the   21
Fed’s long-run inflation target was 2-3 percent – the Fed acted as if it was consciously aiming at 
an unemployment rate near zero or even negative. 
  Even observers as critical of Fed policy in the 1960s-70s as DeLong (1997) would not 
argue that the Fed consciously aimed at zero unemployment. 
10 More likely, the zero estimated 
unemployment target reflects an unaccounted for political constraint facing the Fed. DeLong 
describes in great detail the lack of a political mandate during the 1970s for the high 
unemployment that would have been necessary to bring inflation under control, the most obvious 
manifestation of which was the intense pressure from the Nixon Administration to maintain low 
unemployment prior to the 1972 election. The estimates provided here suggest that this political 
pressure – or something like it – that pushed the Fed’s implicit unemployment target down is a 
more likely cause of the Great Inflation than misperceptions of the natural rate. 
  Finally, what of Orphanides’ argument that similar misperceptions of the natural rate of 
unemployment could cause inflation to become a problem again under the current monetary 
policy rule? Suppose the natural rate, currently estimated to be around five percent, were to rise 
to six percent without the Fed’s being aware of it. Based on the estimates of b given for the 
1983-97 period referenced above (which range from .014 to .076), the effect on inflation would 
be minimal. There seems to be room for the Fed to maintain or even increase attention to its 
independent unemployment target. 
   
5.  Summary and conclusions 
  This paper has investigated whether misperceptions of the natural rate of unemployment 
could have caused the Great Inflation of the 1970s. While previous studies have modeled 
                                                 
10 DeLong cites Samuelson and Solow’s (1960) “nonperfectionist’s goal” of 3 percent unemployment as a lower 
bound for the Fed’s target unemployment rate.   22
monetary policy using a Taylor rule, this paper assumes monetary policymakers choose 
combinations of inflation and unemployment to minimize a quadratic loss function. The result is 
that the Fed follows a “targeting” rule rather than an “instrument” rule. The targeting rule and the 
Phillips curve are estimated with an approach that restricts the information set of the 
policymakers at each date to the macroeconomic data that actually would have been available to 
them at that date. Estimates of the model lead to the following conclusions. 
  The targeting rule provides a reasonably good fit to the data on inflation and 
unemployment for the U.S. during the period 1969-79. Contrary to the view expressed in CGG 
(2000) that monetary policy was unstable during this period, policymakers behaved like inflation 
targeters, albeit with a slow rate of convergence to the long-run inflation target relative to 
policymakers in the 1980s and 1990s.  
  The Federal Reserve seems to have consistently underestimated the natural rate of 
unemployment during the 1970s. While we do not have direct evidence of the Fed’s natural rate 
target and only estimates of the actual natural rate, it is fair to assume that the Fed believed the 
natural rate was around 5 percent during the 1970s whereas the actual rate averaged around 6 
percent. In principle, this would have caused the Fed to pursue overly expansionary policies that 
would have caused inflation systematically to exceed the inflation target. 
  Estimates of the model, however, suggest that a mistake of this magnitude would not have 
been sufficient to explain the actual high rates of inflation that prevailed from 1969-79. While 
the weight on inflation in the Fed’s loss function is estimated to be in the range of .70 to .85 (in 
the partial adjustment model), the weight would have had to be as low as .15 in order for 
misperceptions of the natural rate to account for the entire difference between average inflation 
in the 1970s versus the 1980s-90s.   23
  The cause of high inflation in the 1970s appears instead to be due to a higher inflation 
target. This high inflation target probably reflects not a preference for higher inflation, but a 
desire to maintain unemployment below even reasonable real-time estimates of the natural rate. I 
speculate that this desire is in turn a reflection of the political environment of the time. 
  The Fed’s current policy rule does not leave us susceptible to a repeat of the Great 
Inflation due to misperceptions of the natural rate of unemployment. The estimated weight on 
inflation in the Fed’s loss function is higher than it was in the 1970s. In the event of an 
unanticipated increase in the natural rate that resulted in an increase in inflation, policymakers 
would react strongly enough to prevent inflation from getting out of control. In fact, the Fed 
today behaves very much like a strict inflation targeter, assigning essentially no independent 
weight to unemployment fluctuations. The Fed could adopt a less strict inflation targeting rule 
without fear of the misperceptions problem discussed by Orphanides. 
  On the other hand, to the extent that the Great Inflation was a result of the political 
environment of the 1970s  it could be repeated regardless of the policy rule adopted by the Fed. 
It is easy to imagine circumstances under which the president, Congress, and the public once 
again become intolerant of unemployment rates high enough to keep inflation stable and demand 
that the Fed pursue an excessively expansionary monetary policy. While nominally independent, 
the Fed might – as it did in the 1970s – yield to political pressure rather than see its autonomy 
stripped from it. Absent a constitutional amendment – and even this might not be sufficient– no 
policy rule, even a strict inflation targeting rule, could guarantee that the experience of the 1970s 
would not be repeated. 
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Actual: GNP deflator, from DRI macro database, January 2003. 
 
Forecast: Each forecast series takes the price level in the quarter preceding the date of the 
forecast as known. Forecasted price levels are the levels implied by the Greenbook forecasts of 
the GNP deflator inflation rate. Forecasts made in the first quarter of each year for quarters 1 to 4 
are shown. Forecasts taken from the Greenbook for the FOMC meeting nearest to the middle of 
the first quarter.   26








































Actual: Civilian unemployment rate, from DRI macro database, January 2003. 
 
Forecast: Each forecast series takes the unemployment rate in the quarter preceding the date of 
the forecast as known. Forecasts made in the first quarter of each year for quarters 1 to 4 are 
shown. Forecasts taken from the Greenbook for the FOMC meeting nearest to the middle of the 
first quarter.   27
















Actual: Percent change in GNP deflator from end of period t-1 to end of period t+3. 
 
Forecast: From Greenbook for FOMC meeting nearest to middle of quarter. Forecasted percent 
change in GNP deflator from end of period t-1 to end of period t+3. 
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Actual: Average civilian unemployment rate from period t-1 to period t+3. 
 
Forecast: From Greenbook for FOMC meeting nearest to middle of quarter. Average forecasted 
civilian unemployment rate from period t-1 to period t+3. 
 
“Actual” natural rate: computed as 10-year two-sided moving average of actual civilian 
unemployment rate. 
 
“Real-time” natural rate: computed as 10-year backward moving average of actual civilian 
unemployment rate.   29
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Forecast Implied by model
Unemployment gap (VAR forecast)
 
 
Forecast: One-quarter-ahead inflation forecast, current-quarter unemployment gap forecast from 
Greenbook or VAR. 
 
Implied by model: Fitted values from equation (14). For unemployment gap, actual (Greenbook 
or VAR forecast) data used for inflation rate and future unemployment gaps. For inflation rate, 
actual (Greenbook or VAR forecast) data used for current and future unemployment gaps. 
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Forecast Implied by model
Inflation rate (VAR forecast)
 
 
Forecast: One-quarter-ahead inflation forecast, current-quarter unemployment gap forecast from 
Greenbook or VAR. 
 
Implied by model: Fitted values from equation (14). For unemployment gap, actual (Greenbook 
or VAR forecast) data used for inflation rate and future unemployment gaps. For inflation rate, 
actual (Greenbook or VAR forecast) data used for current and future unemployment gaps. 
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pt =  0.848  -  0.390  *  1 t u ~
-  +  0.345  * pt-1 +  0.043  * pt-2     
  (0.302)    (0.118)        (0.120)        (0.125)         
                               
    +  0.051  *  pt-3  +  0.325  * pt-4 +  0.057  *  zt  + et 
      (0.125)        (0.111)        (0.016)         
                               
                               
                               
# observations    73               
R
2    0.825               
Breusch-Godfrey test: 
T·R
2 (p-value)    2.517             
 
        (0.642)                
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Table 2. Estimated Euler equation, 1969:1-1979:2 (t-statistics in parentheses). 
 










a  0.546  0.434 0.848 0.708
  (0.092)  (0.086) (0.063) (0.079)
p*  5.247  5.947 5.467 5.786
  (0.445)  (0.525) (0.462) (0.857)
q  --  -- 0.422 0.465 
    (0.054) (0.097)
         
No. observations  33  42 33 42
Sum squared residuals  6.138  7.085 1.877 5.751




Euler equation estimated by nonlinear least squares in second step of two-step procedure. Phillips curve coefficients 
set to estimated values in Table 1. 
 
Standard model:  
  al(E t-1pt+1-p*)-(1-a)[E t-1 t u ~ -f 1Et-1 1 t u ~
+ -f 2Et-1 2 t u ~
+ -f 3Et-1 3 t u ~
+ -f 4Et-1 4 t u ~
+ ] = 0. 
 
Partial adjustment model:  
  al[(E t-1pt+1- Et-1pt+1*)-q(E t-1pt+2- Et-1pt+2*)]-(1-a)[E t-1 t u ~ -f 1Et-1 1 t u ~
+ -f 2Et-1 2 t u ~
+ -f 3Et-1 3 t u ~
+ -f 4Et-1 4 t u ~
+ ]=0. 
  pt* = (1-q)p*+qpt-1 
 
   33















Marginal effect of misperceptions (b)  0.503 0.791 0.324 0.871
Misperception of unemployment gap (x-h)  1.077 1.039 1.077 1.039
Misperception of actual rate (x)  0.037 -0.001 0.037 -0.001
Misperception of natural rate (h)  -1.040 -1.040 -1.040 -1.040
Total effect of misperceptions b(x-h)  0.505 0.824 0.325 0.907
Effect of misperception of actual rate (bx)  0.019 -0.001 0.012 -0.001





E u ~ - u ~ =x-h, x”Eu-u, h” E n u - n u . 
al
f - a -
= b
) 1 )( 1 (
 (standard model);
2 ) 1 (
) 1 )( 1 (
q - al
f - a -
= b  (partial adjustment 
model).  ￿f = f i  = 0.764 from Table 1.   34




pt =  0.151  -  0.156  *  1 t u ~
-  +  0.483  * pt-1 +  0.026  * pt-2     
  (0.173)    (0.090)        (0.107)        (0.114)         
                               
    +  0.256  *  pt-3  +  0.145  * pt-4 +  0.005  *  zt  + et 
      (0.114)        (0.112)        (0.003)         
                               
                               
                               
# observations    93               
R
2    0.866               
Breusch-Godfrey test: 
T·R
2 (p-value)    3.333             
 
        (0.504)                
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Table 5. Estimated Euler equation, 1983:1-1997:4 (t-statistics in parentheses). 
 
 










a  0.882 0.889 0.967 0.995 
  (0.046) (0.080) (0.036) (0.042) 
p*  3.246 2.193 3.311 2.008 
  (0.110) (0.265) (0.165) (0.710) 
q  -- -- 0.326 0.573 
      (0.057) (0.088) 
         
No. observations  60 60 60 60 
Sum squared residuals  0.791 3.008 0.422 0.773 





Euler equation estimated by nonlinear least squares in second step of two-step procedure. Phillips curve coefficients 
set to estimated values in Table 3. 
 
Standard model:  
  al(E t-1pt+1-p*)-(1-a)[E t-1 t u ~ -f 1Et-1 1 t u ~
+ -f 2Et-1 2 t u ~
+ -f 3Et-1 3 t u ~
+ -f 4Et-1 4 t u ~
+ ] = 0. 
 
Partial adjustment model:  
  al[(E t-1pt+1- Et-1pt+1*)-q(E t-1pt+2- Et-1pt+2*)]-(1-a)[E t-1 t u ~ -f 1Et-1 1 t u ~
+ -f 2Et-1 2 t u ~
+ -f 3Et-1 3 t u ~
+ -f 4Et-1 4 t u ~
+ ]=0. 
  pt* = (1-q)p*+qpt-1 
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  Standard model 
  Greenbook forecasts  VAR forecasts 
  1969-79 1983-97  Difference 1969-79 1983-97 Difference
Inflation target  5.247 3.246  2.001 5.947 2.193 3.754
Effect of misperceptions  0.542 -0.050  0.592 0.822 -0.051 0.873
Predicted inflation rate  5.789 3.196  2.593 6.769 2.142 4.626
Actual inflation rate  6.274 2.790  3.484 6.274 2.790 3.484
             
  Partial adjustment model 
  Greenbook forecasts  VAR forecasts 
  1969-79 1983-97  Difference 1969-79 1983-97 Difference
Inflation target  5.467 3.331  2.136 5.786 2.008 3.778
Effect of misperceptions  0.349 -0.028  0.377 0.905 -0.011 0.916
Predicted inflation rate  5.816 3.303  2.513 6.691 1.997 4.694






Inflation target as estimated in Tables 2 and 6. Effect of misperceptions calculated as in Table 3. Predicted inflation 
rate is inflation target plus effect of misperceptions. Actual inflation rate is average over period.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 